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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
The Future of SALT: A Broader Picture
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
The federal tax system interacts with state 
systems in many ways, but the state and local tax 
deduction — one of the largest points of interface 
— is perhaps the most susceptible to direct 
analysis.1 There has been much theorizing as to 
how best to structure the SALT deduction. 
However, because of the limitations of tax politics, 
the assumption has long been that the SALT 
deduction could only be changed glacially or by 
subterfuge — or by both (consider the effects of 
the alternative minimum tax).2 The 2017 federal 
tax legislation, however, changed the SALT 
deduction dramatically. Specifically, for taxpayers 
who still itemize, the deduction is now capped at 
$10,000 for a combination of property and income 
(or sales) taxes.3
Much of the critical attention has been on how 
states could and should respond to this cap — 
particularly those with many taxpayers who will 
pay more because of it. Here, we will consider the 
question from a somewhat different perspective. 
The changes to the SALT deduction indicate that 
further amendment might be possible. Indeed, to 
the extent that this change is unpopular in large 
parts of the county and set to expire, there will 
likely be another reform opportunity. We elect not 
to delve too deeply into why Congress passed the 
changes that it did, but as we will soon show, these 
changes are not consistent with any theory as to 
what the SALT deduction is or should be. To this 
end, we will canvas some such theories to 
consider how future reforms might proceed; 
inevitably, we will also offer thoughts on how 
SALT reform should have gone the first time.
Approach One: 
Reform Based on Income Tax Principle
The SALT deduction is a long-standing 
component of the federal income tax, but its 
merits on income tax principles have long been 
contested. If state and local services represent a 
consumption good, such as paying for a fancy 
dinner, then there is no justification for the SALT 
deduction at all based on income tax principles.4 
Indeed, this is why special benefit assessments, 
payments to governments for specific benefits, are 
not deductible.5 But if one conceives state and 
local taxes as a total loss, making the taxpayer 
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1
See generally Kirk Stark, “The Federal Role in State Tax Reform,” 30 
Virginia Tax Review 407 (2010).
2
The touchstone for this assumption was the story of how the SALT 
deduction survived tax reform in 1986. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan 
S. Murray, “Showdown at Gucci Gulch,” 113–14 (1987).
3
IRC 164(b)(6).
4
Louis Kaplow, “Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and 
Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax,” Virginia Law Review (Apr. 
1996).
5
Treas. Reg. section 1.164–4.
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unambiguously worse off, then there is a good 
argument for the deduction on income tax 
grounds. Clearly, the truth is somewhere in 
between these two extremes.
Accordingly, one way to think of the new 
SALT cap is as though the federal government 
were asserting that anyone not taking the 
standard deduction or subject to the AMT should 
be credited with no more than $10,000 in taxes not 
levied to pay for a direct benefit. The problem 
here is that this articulation reveals the 
arbitrariness of the new SALT deduction cap, as 
judged by income tax principles.
By contrast, imagine that the federal limit had 
instead been set so that the federal deduction 
would be limited to 50 percent of taxes paid, with 
no cap.6 This change would also have been 
unpopular with many states, but such a change — 
because it is better aligned with income tax theory 
— would also have thrown less of a wrench in the 
tax system of many states.
Therefore, replacing the cap with an 
uncapped, percentage-limited deduction is one 
plausible option for future reform. A related 
alternative for future reform would be to permit a 
deduction for state — but not local — taxes, on the 
theory that local taxes more closely resemble a 
price paid for a particular bundle of goods.7
Approach Two: 
Stabilize State and Local Revenues
The federal SALT deduction cap primarily 
affects taxpayers who pay much more than 
$10,000 in state taxes. Looked at from this 
perspective, the new federal SALT deduction cap 
can arguably be viewed as specifically targeting 
states with both progressive income taxes and 
especially wealthy taxpayers — as this is what 
results in there being many taxpayers who pay 
much more than $10,000. Naturally, those states 
are upset with the new federal SALT deduction 
cap. But might the new cap nevertheless be 
justified as something more than representing 
dislike of progressive taxes or the states that levy 
them? One possible justification is based on the 
fact that progressive tax bases tend to be more 
volatile, and that the federal government has 
reason to want to reduce this fiscal volatility.8
However, the federal SALT deduction cap is a 
very crude instrument for accomplishing this 
goal. First, many of the taxes implicated are local 
property taxes, which are the most stable in the 
state and local arsenal.9 If there is a concern with 
progressive income taxes and their volatility, then 
why cap property taxes?
Second, and more profoundly, the federal 
government has not reduced the fiscal burden on 
states and, if anything, has acted — and 
attempted to act — to dramatically increase that 
burden. Disfavoring a key element of many states’ 
revenue systems while increasing demands on 
those systems is a perverse attempt at limiting the 
harms from fiscal volatility.
Approach Three: 
Improve Operation of the Overall Tax System
Perhaps the federal government does not care 
about state revenue stability and just thinks — 
with some justification — that high subnational 
personal income taxes are not a good idea. For 
instance, the federal government might believe 
that high state personal income taxes layered on 
top of federal personal income taxes cause 
taxpayers to engage in exponentially greater 
distortive behavior to avoid those taxes.
Yet capping the SALT deduction is, again, a 
very crude attempt to accomplish such a goal. 
First, as we have demonstrated elsewhere, the 
amount of distortion caused by state corporate 
income taxes is potentially much greater than that 
caused by state personal income taxes.10 More 
specifically, the distortion caused by the ordinary 
income component of state personal income taxes 
is relatively small compared with the distortions 
stemming from state capital gains taxes and 
6
For a more involved version of this argument, see Daniel Hemel, 
“Easy on the SALT: A Qualified Defense of the Deduction for State and 
Local Taxes,” University of Chicago — Law School, Oct. 28, 2017.
7
Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 
35 Virginia Tax Review 327 (2016).
8
See Stark supra note 1; David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget 
Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 California Law 
Review 749 (2010); and Darien Shanske, “How Less Can Be More: Using 
the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize State and Local Finance,” 31 Virginia 
Tax Review 413 (2012).
9
See Shanske supra at 426-29.
10
Gamage and Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in 
the United States, 111 Northwestern University Law Review 295, 309-34 
(2017).
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corporate income taxes.11 Thus, this rationale 
provides little justification for capping state-level 
ordinary income tax payments. Even more 
perversely, the continued deductibility of 
corporate income taxes means that the amended 
SALT deduction actually encourages states to rely 
more on a form of taxation that increases 
distortion.
If the federal government were really 
concerned about improving the overall 
functioning of the system of raising revenue, 
the clear prescription would be for it to adopt a 
credit-invoice VAT that the states could 
piggyback on.12 The primary hold up here seems 
to be purely political, which resulted in last 
year’s consideration of the destination-based 
cash flow tax. The designers of this complicated 
new tax were clear that it was intended to (in 
part) tax consumption like a VAT.13 So why not 
just impose a well-understood tax used in 
virtually every other country on earth?
Approach Four: 
Make the Federal Tax System More Progressive
As an itemized deduction, the SALT 
deduction disproportionately benefits 
wealthier taxpayers. Capping the deduction 
was therefore one of the more progressive 
components of an otherwise regressive 
legislative package. Of course, the package’s 
overall regressivity rules out progressivity as 
the reason the SALT deduction was capped, but 
this argument could motivate a future Congress 
and is certainly a legitimate consideration. 
Thus, capping the SALT deduction has the 
curious impact of making the federal system 
more progressive while putting lots of pressure 
on the states to be less progressive.
A more straightforward — if expensive — 
way to make the SALT deduction more 
progressive would be to expand its availability 
by making it into a credit or an above-the-line 
deduction (perhaps along with limiting the 
deduction or credit to only a percentage of taxes 
paid).14 This approach could encourage 
federalism by making state and local taxes less 
costly for a wider swath of taxpayers, which is 
another value that a future Congress could 
choose to encourage.
Conclusion
To review, here is a set of theoretically 
coherent, defensible, and some even mutually 
consistent approaches that the federal 
government could have taken — and may yet take 
— to reform the SALT deduction:
1. On income tax principles, make the 
deduction an uncapped percentage of 
state and local taxes paid.
2. To advance state revenue stability, make 
more stable state and local levies 
(especially property taxes) more 
deductible.
3. To improve the efficiency of the federal 
and state tax systems, the federal 
government could implement a national 
credit-invoice VAT that the states could 
supplement, thereby allowing states to 
abandon their much less efficient retail 
sales taxes. Reducing the SALT deduction 
could be used as a stick to get states to 
replace their less efficient taxes with more 
efficient alternatives.
4. To improve the efficiency of the federal 
and state tax systems, the federal 
government could discourage corporate 
income taxes in particular.
5. To make the SALT deduction more 
progressive and to reduce taxes for all 
state and local taxpayers, the federal 
government could make some portion of 
the SALT deduction an above-the-line 
deduction or a credit.                             
11
Id.
12
Id. at 363.
13
Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen, John Vella, 
“Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation,” at *4, Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation (Feb. 6, 2017).
14
For example, in 2008-10, Congress permitted up to $1,000 (joint 
return) in property taxes to be deducted “above the line.” For some 
credit options, see Frank Sammartino and Kim Rueben, “Revisiting the 
State and Local Tax Deduction,” Tax Policy Center, Urban Institute & 
Brookings Institution, Mar. 31, 2016.
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